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We explore the joint determination of product diﬀerentiation strategy and
corporate leverage in a setting where (i) product diﬀerentiation is valued by
customers; (ii) debt is necessary to discipline managers; and (iii) liquidation
is costly for customers, in particular, when products are highly diﬀerentiated
from competitors’ products. We show that when managerial incentive prob-
lems call for high leverage, ﬁrms position their products closer to competitors
to reduce deadweight costs customers incur in liquidation. We discuss our
ﬁndings in light of case study evidence.
11 Introduction
During the mid 1990s, Apple Computer Inc. experienced severe ﬁnancial and op-
erating diﬃculties.1 It piled up record losses, suﬀered internal turmoil, and had
its debt ratings dramatically downgraded.2 These developments raised concerns
among ﬁnancial market observers about Apple’s long–term viability. Software mak-
ers began to worry about Apple’s survival prospects, too. Quoting from Apple’s
1998 10–K ﬁling: “To the extent the company’s ﬁnancial losses in prior years and
declining demand for the company’s products [...] have caused software developers
to question the company’s prospects [...], developers could be less inclined to de-
velop new application software [...] and more inclined to devote their resources to
developing and upgrading software for the larger Windows market.” This suggests
that the exit of Apple from the computer market would have imposed substantial
costs on its customers. First, software makers most likely would have refrained
from developing new software for the Mac. Second, customers would have lost the
opportunity to repurchase a Mac in the future. As a result, quasirents from cur-
rent investments in software and learning would have evaporated. Not surprisingly,
therefore, Apple’s crisis led soon to a crisis of conﬁdence among Apple’s potential
customers. Despite aggressive price cuts, Apple saw its market share dramatically
shrink.3 A quote from Business Week (February 2, 1996) illustrates a potential
customer’s perception of the crisis: “[...] after Apple announced a $69 million
quarterly loss [...] she crossed Apple oﬀ her list. ‘I can see future directions for
the PC, but I can’t see it for the Mac.’ ”
The example of Apple points to some more general considerations. First, a ven-
dor’s ﬁnancial troubles can make potential customers reluctant to purchase from
the vendor. This feature is particularly relevant for manufacturers of durable equip-
ment for which customers require service, upgrades, and spare parts. To the extent
that these services are most eﬃciently provided by the original manufacturer, liq-
uidation can undermine the availability of after–sales services or make them more
costly. It may also reduce the possibility of purchasing upgrades or of repurchasing
the same product. When the original vendor goes bankrupt, and creditors take
control over the ﬁrm’s assets, the latter cannot be compelled to fulﬁll the implicit
(or explicit, e.g. warranty coverage) contracts regarding the provision of future ser-
vices or add–on products. As a result, consumers should be reluctant to purchase
durable, service–intensive products from highly leveraged ﬁrms.
1See Business Week, January 29, 1996, and February 5, 1996.
2From February 1996 to February 1997 Moody’s downgraded Apple’s long–term and subordi-
nated debt ratings four times to B3 and Caa, respectively (San Jose Mercury News, February 26,
1997).
3For instance, from 1995 to 1996 gross margins decreased from 29% to 15% while Apple’s market
share of the world computer market dropped from 8.2% during last quarter of 1995 to 7.1% during
ﬁrst quarter of 1996. From 1996 to 1997 Mac unit sales declined by 27%. See Business Week,
January 29, 1996, and Apple’s 1998 10–K ﬁling.
2Second, sales drops should be more pronounced the more a ﬁrm’s product dif-
fers from competitors’ products. When a product is highly diﬀerentiated from
competitors’ products, customers typically rely on the original manufacturer to ob-
tain product–speciﬁc aftersales services. In contrast, when the product is similar
to those of competitors, customers should be able to get service, spare parts, up-
grades, and complementary products even if the ﬁrm is no longer in the market.
Likewise, when customers have to incur product–speciﬁc learning costs, switching
to an alternative product should not be too costly, provided that the alternative
product is similar to the previously purchased one. Going back the case of Apple,
potential customers presumably would have been much less reluctant to purchase
a Mac if the Mac did not diﬀer so much from the PC (in particular, if customers
could have used PC software on their Macs).
These considerations are consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Opler and
Titman (1994). They observe that highly leveraged ﬁrms lose market share to their
less leveraged competitors in industry downturns. They also ﬁnd that sales drops
tend to be more pronounced in service intensive industries and when products are
highly specialized and diﬀerentiated. Opler and Titman (1994) interpret this as
evidence that sales drops are at least partially driven by customers’ fears to be
left without maintenance service. In an earlier contribution, Opler and Titman
(1993) report that ﬁrms initiating leveraged buy outs (LBOs) have lower R&D
ratios and are less likely to sell durable, service intensive goods, such as equipment
and machinery. This is consistent with the view put forward in the present paper
that LBOs are costly when customers rely on a vendor’s long term viability.
Conversely, empirical studies indicate that R&D expenditures decline after
LBOs. For example, in a sample considered by Kaplan (1989), LBO ﬁrms reduce
capital expenditures by 33% in relation to their industry peers in the two years
following the buyout. Likewise, Hall (1990) reports that increases in leverage were
followed immediately by substantial reductions in R&D investment in a large panel
of US manufacturing ﬁrms during the 1980s.4 These ﬁndings can be interpreted as
LBO ﬁrms being less tempted to waste free cash ﬂow (as in our paper). Another
interpretation put forward in our paper is that highly leveraged ﬁrms deliberately
engage in less drastic innovation and product diﬀerentiation strategies in order to
reduce the deadweight costs that customers incur in liquidation. Yet, positioning
products too closely to competitors comes at a cost: it toughens price competition
and reduces the product’s perceived value added over competitors’ products.
The aim of this paper is to address the interaction between these two forces,
and to derive implications for optimal product positioning strategies and corporate
leverage. Our contribution is to relate the ﬁrm’s equilibrium ﬁnancial structure to
the characteristics of its product choice, and vice versa. How should companies
4Smith (1990) reports similar patterns. See also Hall (2002) for an excellent survey of empirical
studies on the ﬁnancing of R&D.
3adjust capital structure when liquidation is costly for customers? What, in turn,
is the optimal product diﬀerentiation strategy when a company is highly leveraged
and faces high bankruptcy risk?
We provide answers to these questions by considering the joint determination
of product diﬀerentiation strategy and corporate leverage in a setting where (i)
product diﬀerentiation is valued by customers; (ii) debt is necessary to discipline
managers; and (iii) liquidation is costly for customers, in particular, when products
are diﬀerentiated from competitors’ products. The trade oﬀ between strengthen-
ing managerial incentives and reducing liquidation deadweight costs leads to the
prediction that the equilibrium degree of product diﬀerentiation is limited by the
severity of agency problems. In particular, we show that when managerial incentive
problems call for high leverage, ﬁrms position their products closer to competitors
in order to reduce liquidation deadweight costs imposed on customers and thus to
increase their willingness to pay.
Our approach requires that consumers can observe leverage. If leverage were
unobservable, it could not possibly inﬂuence consumers, and, consequently, there
would be no gain to commit to low leverage. Unobservability of leverage thus results
in high leverage, low customer conﬁdence, and suppressed operating proﬁts. This
suggests that ﬁrms may have incentives to make voluntary public announcements
about their ﬁnancial structure to inﬂuence not only ﬁnancial market players but also
potential customers. We believe that this is of particular importance after adverse
economic shocks. For instance, during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1998, public
announcements made by companies listed on the South Korean stock exchange
soared by 80% (see Korea Times, January 15, 1999). Concerning the demand side
of the market, we argue that consumers indeed have incentives to gather information
about the ﬁnancial soundness of a ﬁrm they plan to purchase from. The reason is
that rational consumers will take into consideration the “life-cycle”, total cost of
ownership of a product they consider purchasing.5
Our research complements a growing literature on how corporate ﬁnancial struc-
ture is inﬂuenced by various product market considerations, and vice versa (see,
among others, Bolton and Scharfstein 1990, Brander and Lewis 1986, Maksimovic
1988, Maksimovic and Titman 1991, Titman 1984). Closest to our analysis are
Titman (1984) and Maksimovic and Titman (1991). Titman (1984) explores how
ﬁnancial structure is aﬀected by potential customers’ concerns about a ﬁrm’s long
term viability. He shows that in situations where a value–maximizing liquidation
policy cannot be contracted upon directly, ﬁnancial structure can serve as a commit-
ment mechanism to liquidate only when liquidation is eﬃcient for all stakeholders,
including customers. We draw on Titman’s argument, but take the analysis one
step further. In particular, Titman ﬁxes product characteristics and shows that
5See, for example, Shapiro (1995) for an account of how companies take into consideration the
total cost of ownership of high–volume copy machines before committing to a purchase.
4ﬁrms producing durable, service–intensive products will have relatively low lever-
age. We argue that ﬁrms should also use channels other than reducing their leverage
in order to increase potential customers’ valuation for their products. In particular,
when managerial incentive problems (or, alternatively, tax considerations) call for
high leverage, ﬁrms should alter the very characteristics of their products, in par-
ticular, reduce their uniqueness. We thus emphasize the importance of examining
the joint determinacy of product diﬀerentiation and corporate ﬁnancing decisions.
The relevance of this consideration is illustrated by the previously discussed indus-
try examples (see also the discussion in section 5) and empirical ﬁndings indicating
that ﬁrms cut down innovation eﬀorts following increases in leverage.
Maksimovic and Titman (1991) consider how ﬁnancial structure alters a ﬁrm’s
incentives to maintain a reputation for producing high quality products. They
show that debt may reduce value by undermining a ﬁrm’s incentives to invest in
reputation. This is because a reduction in quality increases current but decreases
future cash ﬂows, which in their model comes at the expense of debt holders.6
Reputation building concerns play no role in our setting. Rather, our model builds
on the premise that product diﬀerentiation (e.g. quality) increases a customer’s
valuation when the ﬁrm is not liquidated, but also increases deadweight costs that
the customer incurs in liquidation. Thus, in situations where debt is needed to
discipline managers (and, consequently, liquidation in bad states of the world cannot
be avoided) ﬁrms will deliberately refrain from adopting overly drastic product
diﬀerentiation choices.
This paper is also related to industrial organization literature on second sourc-
ing. Farrell and Gallini (1988) consider a monopolist’s temptation to exploit cus-
tomers once they have incurred product–speciﬁc investments. They demonstrate
that the monopolist can solve the hold up problem by licensing its product to com-
petitors. Thus, as in our model, the supplier guarantees customers that a “second
source” will be available in the future from which customers can purchase at low
cost. However, the mechanism behind their model is rather diﬀerent from ours.
In their model, long–term contracts would eliminate the hold–up problem and the
corresponding ex ante eﬃciency losses. Likewise, in our setting, potential hold–up
problems could be addressed with long–term warranty contracts. Yet, to restore
the disciplinary power of liquidation threats imposed on management, creditors
must not be liable for customers’ warranty claims. As such, warranty protection
will fail in bad states of the world. Eﬃciency losses thus stem from the ﬁrm’s assets
being seized by creditors in default, as a result of which the most eﬃcient after sales
service provider, namely the ﬁrm itself, is no longer able to provide such service.
“Second sourcing” — in our setting, reducing the cost of third party after sales
6Yet, they also demonstrate that substituting equity for debt may commit a ﬁrm not to liquidate
despite liquidation being eﬃcient for ﬁnancial stakeholders (the reason being that equity holdes are
junior in liquidation). This latter eﬀect can increase a ﬁrm’s ability to oﬀer high–quality products.
5service — is targeted to limit these eﬃciency losses.
The present paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the model.
Section 3 explores the interplay between the ﬁrm’s capital structure choice and
product diﬀerentiation strategy within a vertical product diﬀerentiation setting.
Section 4 considers the case of horizontal product diﬀerentiation. Section 5 provides
a discussion of our ﬁndings in light of case study evidence from the computer and
software industries. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
The formal framework elaborates on the interaction between a ﬁrm’s capital struc-
ture choice and product diﬀerentiation strategy. The ﬁrm is run by a management
team, produces a durable product, and provides after sales service. The follow-
ing features of the contracting and product market environment are central to our
analysis: (i) the relationship between the ﬁrm’s initial owners/outside creditors
and the management team is subject to moral hazard. Debt is needed to discipline
management, but may drive the ﬁrm into bankruptcy and liquidation; (ii) liquida-
tion imposes deadweight costs on the ﬁrm’s customers as they have to switch to
less eﬃcient third party providers of after sales service once the ﬁrm is liquidated;
(iii) while customers value variety, product diﬀerentiation increases potential dead-
weight costs in liquidation.
Formally, we consider a two–period model with three dates, T = 0;1;2. All
agents are risk neutral and the risk free interest rate is normalized to zero. The
timing of events is illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
T = 0 T = 1 T = 2
-
– leveraged buy out
– product positioning
– cash ﬂows realize
– liquidation?
– after sales service
Figure 1: Timing
At T = 0, the ﬁrm’s initial owners sell the ﬁrm to the management team through
a leveraged buy out (to be explained in detail below). The ﬁrm (respectively, man-
agement) subsequently decides about its product diﬀerentiation strategy, quotes a
price for its product, and potential customers decide whether to purchase from the
ﬁrm (after having observed the ﬁrm’s leverage, product design, and prices). At
T = 1, cash ﬂows realize. From an ex ante perspective, these are uncertain. For
simplicity, we suppose that the ﬁrm either generates income equal to its product
market revenues or no income at all (in the latter case, the ﬁrm is subject to a
severe cost shock). Let µ denote the probability that the ﬁrm is not subject to the
cost shock. We refer to 1 ¡ µ as the ﬁrm’s default risk. At this stage, the ﬁrm’s
6creditors may liquidate the ﬁrm and seize its assets. If the ﬁrm is not liquidated,
after sales service is provided by the ﬁrm during the second period.
The relationship between the ﬁrm’s initial owners/creditors and the manage-
ment team needed to run the ﬁrm is subject to moral hazard. We consider the
unveriﬁable cash ﬂows framework along the lines of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)
and Hart and Moore (1998). Income is unveriﬁable (but observable) and manage-
ment can divert it. There are several alternatives how the ﬁrm’s initial owners
could address the agency problem. As will be discussed in more detail below, in
our setting, the most convenient way for the owners to beneﬁt from their claims
is to sell the ﬁrm’s assets to management via a leveraged buy out. Management
thus issues debt on a competitive credit market, transfers the proceeds of the debt
issue to the initial owners, and takes ownership of the ﬁrm’s assets. The liquidation
threat associated with debt disciplines management to pay out free cash ﬂow as
long as liquidation is costly for management (Jensen 1986). These costs can stem
from losses of reputation, of control beneﬁts, and of other private beneﬁts. Gilson
(1989) provides empirical evidence that these losses can be quite substantial. He
ﬁnds that about more than half of the managers of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms are
replaced and not hired by comparable, exchange–listed ﬁrms for at least three years.
We capture these costs by assuming that management loses an amount B > 0 if
the ﬁrm is liquidated and creditors seize its assets.7
The T = 1 liquidation value of the ﬁrm’s assets is given by L. To make the
analysis interesting, we assume that liquidation is ineﬃcient, L < B. We allow for
partial liquidation. For simplicity, there are constant returns to scale: if creditors
seize a fraction ¯ 2 [0;1] of the ﬁrm’s assets, the ﬁrm survives subsequent asset
restructuring with probability 1 ¡ ¯ and fails with probability ¯ (in which case
assets become worthless and the ﬁrm exits). Expected liquidation proceeds and
management’s continuation control beneﬁt are thus given by ¯L and (1 ¡ ¯)B,
respectively. A credit contract speciﬁes a repayment R to be made at T = 1. If
management pays out R, the ﬁrm is not liquidated.8 If management does not pay
out R, creditors are entitled to seize a fraction ¯ > 0 of the ﬁrm’s assets and collect
the liquidation proceeds. As we shall argue below, ¯ is closely related to the ﬁrm’s
leverage (the value of debt claims over the total value of the ﬁrm).
We now turn to the description of the product market characteristics. Until
section 4, we consider a representative consumer with preference for variety. The
7More precisely, we suppose that management gains a control beneﬁt B if the ﬁrm is not
liquidated. See Dyck and Zingales (2001) for a comparative empirical analysis of private beneﬁts
of control. Most generally, the parameter B can be thought of being inversely related to the
severity of managerial incentive problems. This allows to relate B to variables that are typically
employed in empirical analysis to proxy the severity of agency problems (see e.g. La Porta et
al. 1997, 1998).
8This is without loss of generality as long as the assets’ liquidation value is suﬃciently low rel-
ative to the liquidation deadweight costs imposed on customers, which we will assume throughout
the text. See the appendix for a full characterization of the optimal ﬁnancial contracts.
7ﬁrm is innovative in that it can diﬀerentiate its product from the product oﬀering
of a competitive fringe. A product with design t 2 [0;1) gives the consumer a
payoﬀ of V (t) (over the two periods), where V (t) is twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable, V (0) = 0, V 0(t) > 0, V 00(t) < 0, and limt!1 V 0(t) = 0. The competitive
fringe produces a product with design t0 = 0 at zero marginal cost. We normalize
the payoﬀ from consuming the competitive fringe’s product to zero. Thus, in the
absence of liquidation deadweight costs, the representative consumer’s willingness
to pay would be given by V (t).
The consumer relies on after sales service during the second period. It is inessen-
tial for our argument whether the consumer pays for after sales service up front or
when the service is provided. We thus consider long term “warranty” contracts:
if the ﬁrm is not liquidated, it provides after sales service (for simplicity, at zero
marginal cost). In contrast, if creditors seize the ﬁrm’s assets, after sales service
can no longer be provided by the ﬁrm. In this case the consumer has to turn to
one of many third party service providers. These service providers compete ` a la
Bertrand and their cost of providing service (and thus the price charged for it)
depends on the degree of product diﬀerentiation. The more the product is diﬀer-
entiated from the competitive fringe’s product oﬀering, the larger is the service
provider’s cost of supplying service (reﬂecting the higher costs of providing service
for such a product). Formally, the cost of providing service by a third party is given
by C(t) = ®c(t), where c(t) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, ® > 0, c(0) = 0,
c0(t) > 0, and c00(t) > 0. We refer to ® as the product’s service intensity.
Consistent with most bankruptcy codes (Appelbaum 1992), we assume that
creditors’ claims are senior to customers’ warranty claims. Thus, creditors cannot
be held liable for customers’ claims. In contrast, the initial owners would be li-
able for customers’ claims if they did not sell the ﬁrm’s assets to management via
a leveraged buy out and instead employed a managerial incentive scheme. This
implies that a termination threat by the initial owners on management would lack
credibility as they would internalize the deadweight costs imposed on customers
when ﬁring management and liquidating the ﬁrm (management is essential for eﬃ-
ciently providing after sales service). As such, the initial owners would be reluctant
to indeed stick to termination. In contrast, creditors can impose a credible threat
of liquidation on management as they do not internalize the deadweight costs liqui-
dation imposes on customers. This explains why a leveraged buy out is preferable
in our setting.9
Under an incentive compatible and feasible contract, management pays out R
in the high cash ﬂow state, the ﬁrm is continued, and customers are provided
with after sales service at zero cost. In the low cash ﬂow state, management has to
9The importance of hard claims (debt) as a means of constraining management is by now well
accepted in the literature. See, for example, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Hart and Moore
(1997).
8default and is liquidated at scale ¯. The ﬁrm’s remaining assets enable management
to provide after sales service with probability 1 ¡ ¯. If management is unable to
provide after sales service, customers must approach the less eﬃcient third party
service provider and are charged C(t). The representative consumer’s willingness
to pay for the ﬁrm’s product is thus given by V (t) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¯C(t).
It is important to stress that the ineﬃciencies in our setting do not per se stem
from creditors not being liable for customers’ warranty claims. Neither does it mat-
ter whether customers pay for service up front or when it is provided. If customers
were to pay for service ex post, the total surplus captured by the initial owners
would not be altered. This is because the service revenues would be oﬀset by a pro-
portionate reduction in the initial price. Rather, ineﬃciencies stem from the ﬁrm’s
assets being seized by creditors in default, as a result of which the most eﬃcient
service provider, namely the ﬁrm itself, is no longer able to provide service.10 The
associated eﬃciency losses are born ex ante by the ﬁrm’s initial owners, who thus
face a trade oﬀ between strengthening managerial incentives to pay out free cash
ﬂow and reducing liquidation deadweight costs.
3 Corporate Leverage and Product Diﬀerentiation
This section explores the interplay between the ﬁrm’s choice of capital structure
and product diﬀerentiation strategy. In practice, management will pick the level of
product diﬀerentiation after having taken over the ﬁrm (i.e. once capital structure
has been ﬁxed) in order to maximize its payoﬀ. The level of product diﬀerentiation
that is optimal for management at this stage may not be ex ante optimal for
the ﬁrm’s initial owners, i.e. maximize the proceeds of the debt issue. Yet, as
will be discussed in more detail below, there is no conﬂict of interest between
management and ﬁnancial stakeholders about the choice of product diﬀerentiation.
If the latter were not contractible, management would stick to the level of product
diﬀerentiation that maximizes the proceeds of the debt issue. The analysis thus
proceeds as follows. We ﬁrst derive the ﬁrm’s optimal capital structure, taking the
level of product diﬀerentiation as given. We subsequently characterize the ex ante
optimal level of product diﬀerentiation. We complete the argument by showing
that management would not deviate from this level of product diﬀerentiation.
Consider a credit contract (R;¯) and suppose the ﬁrm generates revenues Π.
If management pays out R at T = 1, the ﬁrm is continued and management cap-
tures its control beneﬁt B. If it defaults strategically (suppose for a moment that
management can pay out R in the high cash ﬂow state), creditors are entitled to
liquidate a fraction ¯ of the ﬁrm’s assets and collect the liquidation proceeds. Yet,
liquidation is ineﬃcient and management has cash reserves Π which it can use
10We do not allow for ex post renegotiation between creditors and customers. This can be
justiﬁed with the potentially large number of customers. It thus would be prohibitively costly for
creditors and customers to enter renegotiation.
9to buy back assets from creditors. We assume for simplicity that creditors make
a take–it–or–leave–it renegotiation oﬀer to management. Creditors oﬀer manage-
ment to liquidate a fraction ¯0 < ¯ of the ﬁrm’s assets in exchange for management
making a cash transfer R0. The renegotiation oﬀer maximizes creditors’ payoﬀ
R0 + ¯0L subject to three relevant constraints, (i) management’s acceptance con-
straint, Π¡R0+(1¡¯0)B ¸ Π+(1¡¯)B, (ii) the cash constraint, R0 · Π, and (iii)
¯0 ¸ 0. Supposing that ¯B · Π, this problem is solved for ¯0 = 0 and R0 = ¯B.
Management thus has incentives to pay out R in the high cash ﬂow state (rather
than defaulting strategically and triggering renegotiation) if and only if R · ¯B.
Next, suppose the ﬁrm is subject to the cost shock, i.e. does not generate any
income. Management has to default for liquidity reasons and creditors liquidate a
fraction ¯ of the ﬁrm’s assets. There is no room for renegotiation since management
has nothing to oﬀer in exchange for creditors waiving their liquidation rights.
It is worthwhile to contrast these outcomes with a situation where sharehold-
ers do not initiate a leveraged buy out but instead impose a managerial incentive
scheme. In our setting, a managerial incentive contract stipulates that shareholders
have the right to ﬁre management (in which case the ﬁrm is liquidated) with prob-
ability ¯ if and only if management does not pay out a dividend R. Consider then
the renegotiation stage after strategic default. If shareholders exercised the liqui-
dation option, their expected payoﬀ would amount to ¯(L ¡ C(t)). Thus, as long
as C(t) > L (which we assume), shareholders’ payoﬀ from proceeding with liquida-
tion would be negative (recall that shareholders, in contrast to creditors, are liable
for customers’ warranty claims). This implies that shareholders would not stick to
liquidation if renegotiation after strategic default broke down. Termination threats
imposed by shareholders thus lack credibility, as a result of which shareholders are
unable to extract free cash ﬂow from management. Initiating a leveraged buy out
and allocating liquidation rights to creditors allows to restore the disciplinary power
of liquidation threats (but comes at the expense of ineﬃcient liquidation in the low
cash ﬂow state).
An optimal ﬁnancial contract maximizes the proceeds of the debt issue (which
are captured by the initial owners) subject to the contract being feasible, incentive
compatible, and accepted by management (its reservation utility is normalized to
zero). Let Π(¯;t) denote the ﬁrm’s product market income in the high cash ﬂow
state as a function of leverage ¯ and the level of product diﬀerentiation t. Assuming
that the ﬁrm extracts the representative consumer’s willingness to pay, we have
Π(¯;t) = V (t) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¯C(t). The initial owners’ problem is thus to
max
R;¯2[0;1]
µR + (1 ¡ µ)¯L (1)
s:t:
µ(Π(¯;t) ¡ R + B) + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¯)B ¸ 0 (2)
R · ¯B (3)
10R · Π(¯;t) = V (t) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¯C(t) (4)
The optimal ﬁnancial contract is easily derived. Note ﬁrst that management’s
participation constrained (2) is not binding as it is implied by the cash constraint
(4). We are thus left with the managerial incentive constraint (3) and the cash
constraint (4). By inspection, a tougher ﬁnancial structure (¯ high) relaxes the
incentive constraint but tightens the cash constraint. This leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose liquidation is suﬃciently costly for customers: C(t) ¸
L=µ. Then, the optimal ﬁnancial contract is given by
˜ ¯ = min
·
V (t)






˜ ¯B = Π(˜ ¯;t) < B for B > V (t) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)C(t)
B for B · V (t) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)C(t).
(6)
When management’s control beneﬁt B is very low, creditors cannot extract much
from management and the cash constraint is not binding. It thus optimal to punish
strategic default with full liquidation and to give absolute priority to creditors. In
contrast, absolute priority is violated at the optimum as soon as management’s
loss from liquidation is suﬃciently large (formally, for B > V (t) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)C(t), we
have R = ˜ ¯B > ˜ ¯L but ˜ ¯ < 1, hence, absolute priority is violated). In this case,
creditors can extract a lot from management. Yet, a tough ﬁnancial structure is
costly since it impedes the ﬁrm’s survival prospects in the low cash ﬂow state and
as such undermines customers’ willingness to pay. Creditors thus commit not to
liquidate the ﬁrm at full scale if management defaults on outstanding debt claims.
It is worthwhile to note that this contract will not be renegotiated after customers
made their purchasing decisions. This is because the contract is constrained eﬃcient
for management and creditors and hence renegotiation proof.11
If ﬁnancial structure were unobservable, creditors would not give up absolute
priority. Here, the only reason to give up absolute priority is to increase customers’
willingness to pay. However, given customers’ purchasing decisions, it is a best
response for creditors to fully liquidate after default in order to maximize proceeds
from liquidation. This is of course anticipated by customers and hence suppresses
their willingness to pay. As a result, both creditors (respectively, the initial own-
ers) and management would be worse oﬀ if ﬁnancial structure were unobservable
(see the appendix for a characterization of the optimal contract when contracts are
unobservable). This argument suggests that ﬁrms have strong incentives to make
ﬁnancial structure public to not only inﬂuence ﬁnancial market participants but
also other stakeholders, such as customers. One way to do so is to go public, as
11See Dewatripont (1988) and Caillaud et al. (1995) for more on the role of renegotiation–
proofness constraints in models of strategic contract design in order to inﬂuence third parties.
11ﬁnancial disclosure laws require public ﬁrms to disclose ﬁnancial structure.12 Our
conclusions are also in line with empirical evidence indicating that ﬁrms increase
public announcements about ﬁnancial restructuring in periods of economic or ﬁ-
nancial distress. This latter point, as was discussed earlier, is well illustrated by the
disclosure strategies of South–Korean ﬁrms during the East–Asian ﬁnancial crisis.
Consider the next case, C(t) < L=µ. We show in the appendix that in this case
liquidation can occur even if management does pay out.13 Furthermore, the ﬁrm
is fully liquidated after liquidity default. As we would like to highlight the eﬀects
of liquidation deadweight costs on ﬁnancial structure and product positioning, we
assume that these costs are large relative to the asset liquidation value. We thus
restrict attention to the ﬁrst case, C(t) ¸ L=µ. Speciﬁcally, we simplify the model
by setting the liquidation value equal to zero and by assuming that B > V (t) ¡
(1 ¡ µ)C(t) holds at the optimum.
How is creditors’ liquidation right ˜ ¯ related to the leverage of the ﬁrm? Deﬁne
leverage as the value of debt (the proceeds of the debt issue) over the value of debt
and the value of inside equity (i.e. what inside equity holders, namely management,
would be willing to pay for their control rights, if they could). The value of debt is
given by µ˜ ¯B, whereas the value of inside equity is given by µB +(1¡µ)(1¡ ˜ ¯)B.
Thus, leverage is given by
µ˜ ¯
1 ¡ (1 ¡ 2µ)˜ ¯
(7)
It is easily veriﬁed that (7) has the same comparative statics as creditors’ liquidation
right ˜ ¯ = V (t)=(B + (1 ¡ µ)C(t)). We can state the following
Corollary 1 Leverage decreases as agency problems between creditors and man-
agement become less severe, default risk increases, and/or customers incur higher
deadweight costs in liquidation.
These predictions are consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Titman and Wessels
(1988). They ﬁnd that one of the most important predictors of corporate leverage
is the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales, with the relation being negative. This is
in line with our ﬁndings in that ﬁrms with high R&D expenditures tend to produce
highly diﬀerentiated goods for which original manufacturer support is likely to be
a signiﬁcant feature.
We now turn to the ﬁrm’s problem of positioning its product. The initial owners’
aim is to maximize the proceeds from the debt issue. Therefore, the ex ante optimal
12See Pagano et al. (1998) for an empirical study of the determinants of initial public oﬀerings.
Consistent with our intepretation, they ﬁnd that IPOs are followed by lower cost of credit.
13To see why suppose creditors are entitled to liquidate some assets even if management satisﬁes
its payment obligations. As long as the cash constraint is not binding this cannot be optimal since
the marginal expected gain is µL while the marginal expected loss is µB > µL. Creditors are thus
better oﬀ extracting a higher repayment and foregoing the liquidation proceeds. However, if the
cash constraint is binding, the marginal expected loss of liquidation in the high cash ﬂow state is
given by µ(µC). Thus, for µC < L liquidation in the high cash ﬂow state could be optimal.
12degree of product diﬀerentiation t¤ solves
max
t2[0;1)
R = ˜ ¯(t)B =
V (t)
B + (1 ¡ µ)C(t)
B (8)
s:t:
˜ ¯(t) 2 [0;1] (9)
By concavity and assuming that ˜ ¯(t) · 1 is not binding, the optimal degree of
product diﬀerentiation t¤ is unique and characterized by the ﬁrst–order condition
V 0(t¤)B + (1 ¡ µ)®
³
V 0(t¤)c(t¤) ¡ V (t¤)c0(t¤)
´
= 0 (10)












= sign V 0(t¤)c(t¤) ¡ V (t¤)c0(t¤) < 0 (13)
where (12) and (13) follow from the ﬁrst–order condition (10). As the ﬁrst term
is positive, V 0(t¤)c(t¤) ¡ V (t¤)c0(t¤) must be negative. We thus have the following
result:
Proposition 2 The optimal degree of product diﬀerentiation t¤ is unique and char-
acterized by the ﬁrst order condition (10). Product diﬀerentiation is strictly decreas-
ing in the severity of managerial incentive problems, in the default risk 1 ¡ µ, and
in the product’s service intensity ®.
When managerial incentive problems are severe, creditors should be given tough
liquidation rights to restore the disciplinary power of liquidation threats. Yet,
tough liquidation rights suppress customers’ willingness to pay. To counterbalance
this latter eﬀect, the ﬁrm positions its product closer to competitors. Similarly, an
increase in the default risk and/or in the product’s service intensity tend to raise
expected liquidation deadweight costs. These costs are born ex ante by the ﬁrm’s
initial owners. In response, the ﬁrm reduces its leverage and moves its product
closer to competitors’ product oﬀerings.
In principle, the level of product diﬀerentiation that maximizes the proceeds
of the debt issue (and the payoﬀ of the initial owners) may not be optimal for
management once capital structure has been determined. If product diﬀerentiation
were unveriﬁable and up to the discretion of management, the initial owners would
have to contemplate how capital structure would aﬀect management’s choice of
product diﬀerentiation. We shall now argue that management would stick to the ex
ante optimal level of product diﬀerentiation. To see why note that maximizing the
proceeds of the debt issue, ˜ ¯(t)B, where ˜ ¯(t) = V (t)=(B+(1¡µ)C(t)), is equivalent
to maximizing product market revenues Π(˜ ¯(t¤);t) with respect to t, when taking
13capital structure as given. Intuitively, product diﬀerentiation is targeted to relax
the cash constraint for a given capital structure. Yet, the best way to relax the
cash constraint is to maximize product market revenues. Next, note that the cash
constraint is binding at t¤. Henceforth, if management deviated from t¤, it would
have to default for liquidity reasons. After renegotiation, management would not
only transfer the entire product market income to creditors, the ﬁrm would also
be partially liquidated. This shows that management would stick to the ex ante
optimal level of product market diﬀerentiation, even if its choice were unveriﬁable
and up to the discretion of management.
4 Horizontal Product Diﬀerentiation
In the previous section, we considered a representative agent with taste for variety.
The ﬁrm’s product diﬀerentiation choice thus corresponds to a problem of vertical
product diﬀerentiation. Yet, in practice, ﬁrms are often faced with situations where
they have to make product diﬀerentiation choices not only along the vertical but
also the horizontal dimension of the product space. In this section, we provide
a brief discussion of how our analysis extends to the case of horizontal product
diﬀerentiation.
Suppose there is a unit mass of consumers who diﬀer in their “taste” x 2 [0;1]
for a speciﬁc design t 2 [0;1]. A consumer with taste x has a one–period valuation
of v¡(t¡x)2 when purchasing a product with design t (we take v to be suﬃciently
large to have the market always covered). Consumers are uniformly distributed
over [0;1]. As before, there is a competitive fringe producing a product with design
t0 = 0 at zero marginal cost.14 Note that while a monopolistic ﬁrm would position
its product at 1=2 in order to match the taste of the median consumer, here the
ﬁrm picks a higher degree of product diﬀerentiation in order to relieve competitive
pressure from the fringe. The optimal product position in the absence of default risk
or liquidation costs would be given by 2=3, as is easily veriﬁed. In what follows, we
show that the ﬁrm will position its product closer to competitors when liquidation
imposes deadweight costs on customers.
Since the competitive fringe ﬁrms compete ` a la Bertrand and produce at zero
cost, they charge a price of zero for their product oﬀering. When purchasing the
fringe product, a consumer with taste x thus derives a payoﬀ of 2(v ¡ x)2. Con-
versely, when purchasing the innovative ﬁrm’s product, the consumer derives a net
utility of v ¡(x¡t)2 ¡p during the ﬁrst period, where p denotes the price charged
for the product. With probability µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¯), the ﬁrm is not liquidated
at date T = 1 and after sales service is provided by the ﬁrm. With probability
(1 ¡ µ)¯, the ﬁrm is liquidated and after sales service has to provided by the less
14Alternatively, one could consider a duopoly setting where the competitor chooses its location
strategically. This would not yield signiﬁcantly diﬀerent insights.
14eﬃcient third party at cost C(t). The location ˆ x of the indiﬀerent consumer is thus
deﬁned by:
2(v ¡ (ˆ x ¡ t))2 ¡ p ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¯C(t) = 2(v ¡ ˆ x2) (14)
The right hand side is the payoﬀ from purchasing the competitive fringe’s product
oﬀering, while the left hand side is the payoﬀ from consuming the ﬁrm’s product.15
It is easily veriﬁed that (14) reduces to
ˆ x(p) =
p + 2t2 + (1 ¡ µ)¯C(t)
4t
(15)




1 ¡ ˆ x(p)
´
p (16)
This problem is solved for
p =
2t(2 ¡ t) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¯C(t)
2
(17)




[2t(2 ¡ t) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¯C(t)]2 (18)
To obtain closed form solutions, we give an explicit functional form to the cost
function. For convenience, let C(t) = ®t2. From the previous analysis, the ﬁrm’s
leverage ˜ ¯(t) (as a function of the level of product diﬀerentiation) is given by the
solution of ¯B = Π(¯;t). The optimal degree of product–diﬀerentiation maximizes





˜ ¯(t) 2 [0;1] (20)













Let ˆ B ´ 16=(27(2 + ®(1 ¡ µ))). It is easily veriﬁed that ˜ ¯(t¤) < 1 if and only if
B > ˆ B. We can state the following
Proposition 3 Suppose B > ˆ B. Then, the ﬁrm positions its product at t¤ 2
(0;2=3) and moves closer to competitors when managerial incentive problems be-
come more severe, the ﬁrm faces higher default risk, and/or the product becomes
more service–intensive.
15We should stress that the subgame in which consumers decide whether to purchase a product
after having observed prices and leverage may have multiple equilibria. In this case, consumers may
fail to coordinate on the pareto–eﬃcient equilibrium that minimizes the ﬁrm’s failure probability
and maximizes gains from trade. We restrict attention to the pareto–eﬃcient equilibrium.
15This corresponds to the previously derived intuition: to restore customer conﬁdence
the ﬁrm moves closer to competitors when managerial incentive problems call for
high leverage. The equilibrium price, proﬁts, and leverage are given by p = 4=3 t¤,
Π = 4=9 t¤, and ˜ ¯ = 4=(9B) t¤, respectively. Prices and proﬁts thus display
the same comparative statics as the optimal level of product diﬀerentiation. They
are decreasing in the default risk, in the service intensity, and in the severity of
managerial incentive problems. Leverage is decreasing in the default risk and the
service intensity, but increasing in the severity of managerial incentive problems.
5 Discussion: Diﬀerentiation versus TCO
The trade oﬀ between diﬀerentiation and total cost of ownership (TCO) allows to
shed light on some critical issues companies are facing when deciding about ﬁnanc-
ing and product diﬀerentiation strategies. Industrial organization theory (Tirole
1990) and the strategic management literature (Porter 1985) suggest a number of
ways how companies can diﬀerentiate themselves from competitors in order to sus-
tain superior product market rents. We discussed the possibility of vertical product
diﬀerentiation (e.g. innovation) and horizontal product diﬀerentiation. Yet another
strategy to capture product market rents is to lock in customers to a certain prod-
uct. For example, Padilla (1995) demonstrates within a switching cost setting that
customer lock–in unambiguously leads to higher proﬁts through its softening ef-
fects on price competition.16 In light of Padilla’s ﬁndings, one would expect that
companies endogenously design lock–in situations. Anecdotical evidence suggests
that these considerations are particularly relevant in the technology industries. For
instance, customer lock–in through ﬁrm–speciﬁc software standards is commonly
regarded to be a key driver for companies in the storage networking industry to
capture superior product market rents (see Merrill Lynch research report, March
27, 2002).
This paper’s ﬁndings suggest that diﬀerentiation (vertical, horizontal, lock–
in/endogenous switching costs) has a downside in that it can increase a potential
customer’s total cost of ownership. When customers rely on a supplier’s contin-
ued support and the supplier has poor ﬁnancial prospects, potential customers’
willingness to pay for a highly diﬀerentiated product may be suppressed. This sug-
gests that in situations where leverage is needed to discipline managers, ﬁrms may
deliberately refrain from choosing overly drastic product diﬀerentiation strategies.
Conversely, one would expect the most innovative ﬁrms to be subject to disciplinary
16In standard switching cost settings the presence of switching costs gives rise to eﬃciency
losses only insofar higher prices may deter some consumers from consuming the product. In
contrast, consumers do not incur switching costs in equilibrium. This is diﬀerent in our setting,
where consumers actually incur switching costs in equilibrium, namely when the ﬁrm is liquidated.
Endogenously reducing switching costs and slashing leverage would allow ﬁrms to soften these
eﬃciency losses.
16devices other than arm’s length debt. Our analysis thus provides a novel explana-
tion for why innovative ﬁrms pick monitoring intensive venture capital ﬁnancing,
rather than relying on arm’s length ﬁnancing or unmonitored bank ﬁnancing (Hell-
mann and Puri 2000, Kortum and Lerner 2001).
In light of our ﬁndings, one would expect that companies facing deteriorating
balance sheets “move closer” to competitors in order to address customers’ con-
cerns about total cost of ownership. Coming back to the example of Apple, we will
discuss in the sequel of this section how Apple reacted to its deteriorating ﬁnancial
conditions during the mid 1990s and how our theory allows to shed light on Ap-
ple’s strategy. We shall argue that Apple addressed customer concerns about total
cost of ownership with the introduction of PC–compatible Macs and with giving
software makers additional incentives to develop software for the Mac. We sub-
sequently provide a discussion of how Baan, a Dutch enterprise resource planning
software maker, reacted to its worsening ﬁnancial conditions in 1997/98 by altering
its customer lock–in strategy.
In 1996, Apple introduced PC–compatible Macs which were equipped with two
processors, a PowerPC processor running Mac software, and a Pentium processor
running Windows software. Previously, Mac users could emulate a PC, either
using hardware devices or software. However, hardware devices were expensive,
while cheap software solutions resulted in low speed. In 1998, Apple removed
the dual–platform machines from its product line with the introduction of the
PowerPC G3 processor. The speed of this processor made it possible to entirely
rely on emulation software. One explanation for Apple’s strategy is that it widens
the range of software Mac–users can choose from and thus increases the valuation
consumers attach to the Mac. On the one hand, this increases demand and allows
Apple to charge higher prices. On the other hand, it may also increase competitive
pressures as users which are typically attached to the Mac begin to discover the
whole range of PC–software and the PC itself.
We suggest a complementary explanation for Apple’s strategy. As was discussed
in the introduction, Apple faced deteriorating ﬁnancial conditions during the mid
1990s. Many observers expressed concerns about Apple’s long term viability. Most
likely, an exit of Apple from the computer market would have imposed substan-
tial costs on Mac users as software makers would have refrained from developing
software for the Mac. Achieving PC–compatibility with the introduction of the
dual–platform solution in 1996 and the development of the PowerPC G3 processor
in 1998 reduced the degree to which Mac users must rely on Mac speciﬁc software.
As a result, reluctance of consumers to purchase a Mac should have decreased.
This is consistent with the evolution of Apple’s sales ﬁgures and proﬁts during
those years.17
17From 1996 to 1997, Mac unit sales declined by 27%. From 1997 to 1998, Mac unit sales declined
only by 4%. During 1996 and 1997 Apple made net losses of $816m and $1045m, respectively,
17Apple also tried to restore customer conﬁdence through addressing software
developers’ reluctance to develop software for the Mac (see the quote from Apple’s
1998 10–K ﬁling mentioned in the introduction). At a developer conference in May
1997, top executives of Apple announced that the development platform for its
future operating system would allow developers to generate and deploy applications
not only for the Mac operating system but also for Microsoft’s Windows 95 and
Windows NT (Java World, June 1997). The upside of this strategy is that it
expands the market for software developers and as such makes it more attractive
for software makers to develop software for the Mac. One possible downside is
that the PC becomes an attractive alternative for Apple’s traditional turf, i.e. the
publishing and advertising industry, if there is a wide range of PC–compatible
graphics and publishing software available.
A second example that illustrates our ﬁndings comes from the market for enter-
prise resource planning (ERP) software. In 1997/98, Dutch ERP software maker
Baan started to face ﬁnancial diﬃculties. At that time, Baan launched a joint
venture with JDA (another small player in the ERP market), integrating Baan’s
enterprise software with JDA’s retail management software.18 Baan also imple-
mented several compatibility arrangements, including the launch of more than 200
interfaces allowing customers to easily connect to third–party software, including
competing ERP applications.19 This latter strategy is hard to reconcile with the
notion that software companies should design customer lock–in situations in order
to capture superior product market rents. Our ﬁndings suggest that Baan deliber-
ately reduced customer lock–in to ensure customers not to be left stranded with a
speciﬁc software suite, should Baan fail to continue servicing its customers.
There is a complementary explanation for why Apple faced deteriorating sales
performance after having been hit by losses: the presence of network externalities.
When current sales performance is a signal for current and future network size (and
network size is important for customers), customers may be unwilling to purchase
from a vendor after having observed poor sales performance. Our analysis suggests
that this consideration is even more relevant when the vendor is highly leveraged.
Companies may refrain from adopting overly drastic diﬀerentiation strategies
for reasons diﬀerent from the ones considered in this paper. For example, ver-
tical product diﬀerentiation through quality or innovation is typically subject to
additional production or R&D costs. These observations could be easily captured
within our formal setting considered in section 3 by noting that the value function
V (t) may well have an interior maximum. In this case, ﬁrms would face a trade–oﬀ
between too much and too little diﬀerentiation even in the absence of deadweight
liquidation costs. Our ﬁndings suggest that the presence of liquidation costs shifts
while in 1998 net income was $309m.
18See PC Week, August 26, 1998.
19See Baan press release, October 12, 1998.
18the balance between the costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerentiation towards the cost side.
The relevance of this consideration is demonstrated by the observation that Apple
and Baan reduced customer lock–in in reaction to their worsening ﬁnancial diﬃcul-
ties. These ﬁnancial diﬃculties made potential customers wonder about the ﬁrms’
long term viability. Apple and Baan reacted to these concerns by reducing the
uniqueness of their products.
6 Conclusions
This paper puts forward a theory of the interplay between corporate leverage and
product diﬀerentiation strategy. While existing studies elaborate on the impact
of a ﬁrm’s product characteristics on its ﬁnancial structure, the novelty of our
analysis stems from the observation that product design and diﬀerentiation choices
are equally important choice variables. Building on the premise that debt allows
to discipline managers, our framework thus elaborates on the joint determinacy
of corporate leverage and product diﬀerentiation strategy. Speciﬁcally, we consid-
ered a setting where (i) product diﬀerentiation is valued by customers; (ii) debt
is necessary to discipline managers; and (iii) liquidation is costly for customers, in
particular, when products are highly diﬀerentiated from competitors’ products.
We demonstrate that when managerial incentive problems call for high lever-
age, ﬁrms position their products closer to competitors to reduce deadweight costs
imposed on customers in liquidation and thus to increase their willingness to pay.
Likewise, ﬁrms that are subject to high exogenous insolvency risk should choose
relatively less diﬀerentiated and innovative products, while at the same time slash-
ing leverage. The former strategy reduces deadweight costs imposed on customers
in liquidation, the latter directly addresses customer concerns about the supplier’s
long term viability.
Our ﬁndings suggest several novel insights into the interdependency of ﬁnanc-
ing decisions and product market strategies, such as diﬀerentiation, innovation,
and customer lock–in strategies. While drastic product diﬀerentiation strategies
allow ﬁrms with healthy balance sheets to sustain superior product market rents,
ﬁrms with high leverage and poor balance sheets should be deterred from adopting
overly drastic diﬀerentiation choices. Customers purchasing such products from
ﬁrms in poor ﬁnancial condition may face a too high total cost of ownership. As
was discussed in the previous section, these considerations suggest that the most
innovative ﬁrms should choose monitoring intensive ﬁnancing sources, such as ven-
ture capital ﬁnancing, rather than relying on unmonitored bank ﬁnancing or market
disciplinary devices, such as arm’s length debt.
The present paper’s analysis suggests a number of interesting avenues for fu-
ture research. One issue we abstracted from in this paper are demand comple-
mentarities. When a ﬁrm is highly leveraged and potential customers rely on the
19ﬁrm’s long term viability, one can envision situations where pessimistic perceptions
about the ﬁrm’s viability quickly become self–fulﬁlling. Potential customers refrain
from purchasing as they expect the vendor to fail, thereby driving the vendor into
bankruptcy and liquidation. This consideration is relevant whenever potential cus-
tomers are too dispersed to coordinate their purchasing decisions. In such kind of
situations, customer conﬁdence can be restored through steep price cuts and debt
holders publicly accepting concessions. We address these issues in ongoing research
(Arping and Loranth 2002).
References
Appelbaum, E., 1992, “Bankruptcy, Warranties, and the Firm’s Capital Structure,” International
Economic Review 33, 399–412.
Arping, S. and G. Loranth, 2002, “Leverage, Pricing, and Customer Conﬁdence,” Mimeo, Univer-
sit´ e de Lausanne and London Business School.
Bolton, P. and D. Scharfstein, 1990, “A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Fi-
nancial Contracting,” American Economic Review 80, 93–106.
Bolton, P. and D. Scharfstein, 1996, “Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors,”
Journal of Political Economy 104, 1–25.
Brander, J. and T. Lewis, 1986, “Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The Limited Liability Ef-
fect,” American Economic Review, 76, 956–70.
Caillaud, B., Jullien, B., and P. Picard, 1995, “Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment
and Renegotiation,” Econometrica 63, 621–46.
Dewatripont, M., 1988, “Commitment Through Renegotiation–Proof Contracts with Third Par-
ties,” Review of Economic Studies 55, 377–89.
Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole, 1994, “A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securties and
Manager–Shareholder Congruence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 1027–54.
Dyck, A. and L. Zingales, 2001, “Private Beneﬁts of Control: An International Comparision,”
Working Paper, Harvard Business School.
Farrell, J. and N. Gallini, 1988, “Second–Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to
Attract Competition,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 673–94.
Gilson, S., 1989, “Management Turnover and Financial Distress,” Journal of Financial Economics
25, 241–62.
Hall, B., 1990, “The Impact of Corporate Restructuring on Industrial Research and Development,”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 85–136.
Hall, B., 2002, “The Financing of Research and Development,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
forthcoming.
20Hart, O. and J. Moore, 1995, “Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in
Constraining Management,” American Economic Review 85, 567–85.
Hart, O. and J. Moore, 1998, “Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 113, 1–41.
Hellmann, T. and M. Puri, 2000, “The Interaction Between Product Market and Financing Strat-
egy: The Role of Venture Capital,” Review of Financial Studies 13, 959–84.
Jensen, M., 1986, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,” Ameri-
can Economic Review 76, 323–29.
Kaplan, S., 1989, “The Eﬀects of Management Buy–Outs on Operating Performance and Value,”
Journal of Financial Economics 29, 287–313.
Kortum, S. and J. Lerner, 2001, “Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation,”
RAND Journal of Economics 31, 674–92.
La Porta, R., Lopez–de–Silanes, F. and A. Shleifer, 1997, “Legal Determinants of External Fi-
nance,” Journal of Finance 52, 1131–50.
La Porta, R., Lopez–de–Silanes, F. and A. Shleifer, 1999, “Investor Protection and Corporate
Valuation,” NBER Working Paper No. W7403.
Maksimovic, V., 1988, “Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies,” RAND Journal of Economics
19, 389–407.
Maksimovic, V. and S. Titman, 1991, “Financial Policy and Reputation for Product Quality,”
Review of Financial Studies 4, 175–200.
Opler, T. and S. Titman, 1993, “The Causes of Leveraged Buyouts: Free Cash Flow vs. Financial
Distress,” Journal of Finance 48, 1985–99.
Opler, T. and S. Titman, 1994, “Financial Distress and Corporate Performance,” Journal of Fi-
nance 49, 1015–40.
Padilla, J., 1995, “Revisiting Dynamic Duopoly with Consumer Switching Costs,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 67, 520–30.
Pagano, M., Panetta, F., and L. Zingales, 1998, “Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical
Analysis,” Journal of Finance 53, 27–64.
Porter, M., 1985, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, Free
Press, New York.
Shapiro, C., 1995, “Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak,” Antitrust Law
Journal 63, 483–511.
Smith, A., 1990, “Corporate Ownership Structure and Performance: The Case of Management
Buy Outs,” Journal of Financial Economics 27, 143–64.
21Tirole, J., 1990, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Titman, S., 1984, “The Eﬀect of Capital Structure on a Firm’s Liquidation Decision,” Journal of
Financial Economics 13, 137–51.
Titman, S. and R. Wessels, 1988, “The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice,” Journal of
Finance 43, 1–19.
22Appendix
Characterization of the optimal observable ﬁnancial contract:
Without loss of generality, consider ﬁnancial contracts (¯;R; ¯ ¯; ¯ R) such that the ﬁrm pays out ¯ R
(R) and is liquidated at scale ¯ ¯ (¯) in the high (low) cash ﬂow state. It is easily veriﬁed that
R < 0 is not optimal. Thus, from limited liability R = 0. To simplify notation let ¯ R = R and
suppress t. The optimal ﬁnancial contract solves the following program:
max
R;¯2[0;1];¯ ¯2[0;1]








¡ R + (1 ¡ ¯ ¯)B
¢
+ (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¯)B ¸ 0 (23)
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(26)
To see why note that either (24) or (25) must be binding. Otherwise, one could slightly increase R
without aﬀecting neither constraint and increasing the objective function (22). Note further that
(23) is not binding because of (25) and (¯; ¯ ¯) 2 [0;1]
2.
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µ
³
(¯ ¡ ¯ ¯)B + ¯ ¯L
´
+ (1 ¡ µ)¯L
i
The second expression inside the minimum operator is increasing in ¯ and decreasing in ¯ ¯. The
eﬀect on the ﬁrst expression is ambiguous. It is easily veriﬁed that the ﬁrst expression is decreasing
in ¯ and ¯ ¯ if and only if µC ¸ L.
Consider µC ¸ L (proposition 1): As both expressions inside the minimum operator are
decreasing in ¯ ¯, we have ¯ ¯ = 0. Suppose ¯ is interior. Then, the optimal ¯ solves ¯B =
V ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¯C. Thus,
¯ =
V
B + (1 ¡ µ)C
(28)
and R = ¯B. For B < V ¡ (1 ¡ µ)C, ¯ · 1 is binding such that ¯ = 1 and R = B. This gives
proposition 1.
Next, consider µC < L. The ﬁrst expression inside the minimum operator is increasing in
¯ and ¯ ¯. As both expressions inside the minimum operator are increasing in ¯ we have ¯ = 1.
Suppose that ¯ ¯ is interior. The optimal ¯ ¯ solves V ¡ (µ¯ ¯ + (1 ¡ µ)C) = (1 ¡ ¯ ¯)B. Thus,
¯ ¯ =
B ¡ (V ¡ (1 ¡ µ)C)
B ¡ µC
¸ 0 (29)
for B ¸ V ¡ (1 ¡ µ)C and ¯ ¯ · 1 as long as V ¸ C. For B < V ¡ (1 ¡ µ)C, we have ¯ = 1, ¯ ¯ = 0,
and R = B.
Characterization of the optimal unobservable ﬁnancial contract:
The optimal unobservable contract solves the following program:
max
(¯ ¯2[0;1];¯2[0;1];R)
µ(R + ¯ ¯L) + (1 ¡ µ)¯L
R · (¯ ¡ ¯ ¯)B (30)
R · Π = V ¡ (µ¯ ¯




¤ are the representative consumer’s (rational) beliefs about the exit probabilities
in the high and low cash–ﬂow states, respectively.






(1 ¡ ¯ ¯B) + ¯ ¯L;Π + ¯ ¯L
¤
(32)
This is solved for ¯ ¯ = 1 ¡
Π
B. In equilibrium, ¯ = ¯
¤ and ¯ ¯ = ¯ ¯
¤. Hence,
¯ ¯ =
B ¡ (V ¡ (1 ¡ µ)C)
B ¡ µC
¸ 0 (33)
for B ¸ V ¡(1¡µ)C, and R = (1¡ ¯ ¯)B. For B < V ¡(1¡µ)C, we have ¯ = 1, ¯ ¯ = 0, and R = B.
Proof of proposition 2:





B + (1 ¡ µ)C(t)
(34)
has a unique, interior solution which is characterized by the ﬁrst order condition
Ã(t) = V
0(t)(B + (1 ¡ µ)C(t)) ¡ V (t)(1 ¡ µ)C
0(t) = 0 (35)
First, note that for the case limt!1 V (t) ﬁnite, we have
lim
t!1
˜ ¯(t) = lim
t!1
V (t)
B + (1 ¡ µ)C(t)
= 0 (36)
since C
0(t) > 0. For the case limt!1 V (t) ! 1, we have
lim
t!1






from L’Hˆ opital’s rule, since limt!1 V
0(t) = 0 and C
00(t) > 0. Thus, limt!1 ˜ ¯(t) = 0. Next, ˜ ¯(t)
is continuously diﬀerentiable, ˜ ¯(0) = 0, and ˜ ¯
0(0) > 0. Hence, a maximum t
¤ exists, is interior,
and satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition ˜ ¯
0(t
¤) = Ã(t
¤)=(B + (1 ¡ µ)C(t
¤))
2 = 0. Next, because a
maximum exists Ã(t) = 0 must have a solution. Finally, note that the solution is unique since
Ã
0(t) < 0.
Proof of proposition 3:




[2t(2 ¡ t) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¯®t
2]
2 (38)
is strictly decreasing in ¯ until it obtains a minimum of 0 at ˆ ¯ = 2(2 ¡ t)=((1 ¡ µ)®t). For ¯ > ˆ ¯
prices and proﬁts are zero. Our solution ˜ ¯(t) is therefore the unique positive root of
Π(¯;t) = ¯B (39)














3B[16®(1 ¡ µ) + 27B] ¡ 9B
4®(1 ¡ µ)
(41)
as long as B ¸ ˆ B = 16=(27(2+®(1¡µ))). By inspection, t
¤ is strictly positive, strictly decreasing




































¤ is bounded above by 2=3.
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